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Abstract 
European regional policy evolved partly as a response to the distinctive needs of the UK 
following its accession to the then European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1970s and 
remains a key and well-regarded ‘British contribution’ to the present-day European Union 
(EU). Inspired by this rarely acknowledged reality and the aftermath of the UK’s EU 
referendum in 2016, this paper firstly reflects on the position of regional policy within the 
wider ‘European Project’. It then outlines the material, symbolic and political impacts that 
European regional policy has had on Britain and its deprived regions and communities over 
the past four decades. The outcome of the UK’s 2016 EU referendum is then reviewed from a 
territorial perspective, and some of the key spatial and placed-based contradictions which it 
embodies are unpacked. A reflection on the prospects for place-based policy in a post-EU 
Britain then follows emphasising that the new context invites a reappraisal of the purposes 
and forms of regional development policy. Five tentative scenarios of the UK’s future 
relationship with EU territorial development policy are then presented. The conclusion recalls 
the crucial role that EU regional policy has played in UK regions and communities and calls 
for close attention to be paid over the coming years to the distributional territorial impacts of 
leaving the EU.  
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Introduction  
 
The central question which underpins all choices about place-based (Garcilazo, 2011) 
regional and regeneration policy is whether and how public action should address economic 
and social changes which have varied effects on different places and communities. When it 
comes to the issue of employment the question has often been stated, for example, as being 
one of whether public action should seek to “Bring the people to the work. Or the work to the 
people”. The former option may imply allowing, encouraging or facilitating, migration of 
populations to places of growth, economic opportunity and employment, whilst the second 
might justify active state policy and investment to encourage investment and growth in places 
which have lost economic momentum and face problems of structural change and 
unemployment. The EU’s regional and territorial development, or Cohesion Policy, reflects 
the latter logic in seeking to put into practice the idea of solidarity between the peoples of 
Europe mentioned in the preamble to the Treaty on European Union. It helps a fundamental 
Treaty objective: the strengthening of the EU’s economic and social and territorial cohesion 
by reducing the development disparities between its regions. It also impacts on the 
competitiveness of regions and living conditions of their inhabitants, mainly by co-financing 
multi-annual development programmes. Informed by this, and the aftermath of the UK’s 
referendum on EU membership in 2016, this paper firstly considers the position of EU 
regional policy in the context of the wider ‘European Project’. Secondly, it reviews how the 
regeneration and structural investment delivered under this policy benefitted deprived 
communities in the UK in the decades of its EEC/EU membership. Thirdly, it discusses the 
results of the UK’s 2016 EU referendum from a territorial perspective and unpacks some of 
the spatial and placed based contradictions embedded in these. Fourthly, it reflects on place-
based policy in a post-EU Britain and how the new context invites a reappraisal of the 
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purposes and forms of regional development policy. Fifthly, the paper presents a reflection 
and some tentative scenarios of the UK’s future relationship with EU territorial development 
policy. Finally, the paper concludes by reflecting on the role that EU regional policy has 
played and (at the time of writing continues to play) in UK regions and communities and calls 
for the socio-spatial disciplines to pay close attention in the coming years to monitoring to the 
distributional impacts of leaving the EU on UK people and places.  
 
EU regional policy within the ‘European Project’ 
 
Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) disbursed under the EU’s Cohesion Policy currently 
account for approximately 40-45% of the EU budget and fund area based, sector based, and 
human capital oriented investment. They are reviewed every few years to reflect changing 
needs and political and economic considerations.  There are mixed views about their 
effectiveness but there is evidence that disparities in revenue and employment were declining 
in the EU before the 2008 financial crisis. The EU’s 6th. Cohesion Report (CEC, 2014) thus 
noted that the economic crisis “reversed a long trend of converging GDP rates within the EU” 
and has “also led to increases in poverty and social exclusion” (European Commission, 2014: 
2). To address such trends, the European Social Fund (ESF), for example, continues to fund 
programmes fostering sustainable and quality employment and supporting labour mobility; 
promoting social inclusion, combating poverty and any discrimination; investing in 
education, training and lifelong learning; and, improving the efficiency of public 
administration. In the UK the  ESF programme focuses on reducing inactivity among young 
people and the long-term unemployed with €4.9 billion available to fund operational 
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programmes in Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, England and Gibraltar (European 
Commission,  n.d.).  
 
The EU structural funds thus reflect the ‘social wing’ of the EU project and ‘European model 
of society’ (Faludi, 2007). As such they have often come under pressure from the more 
economically liberal EU member states (also usually the wealthier ones) who wish to 
minimise their own contributions to the EU budget. As noted by Hague (2016) “The UK in 
particular [has] sought an EU Cohesion Policy that would simply be a safety net for the 
poorest regions”. Arguments against structural funds are a version of the view that ‘place-
based’ regional policy and regeneration does not really work and simply diverts scarce 
resources from places where they could be spent with more impact and return, a similar 
position as that advanced domestically in the UK by some liberal think tanks (Leunig et Al., 
2007).  In this account some places have simply outlived their economic purpose and should 
be allowed to whither as their populations move out and move on.  State policy, regulation 
and investment should therefore (except in exceptional circumstances) be place-‘blind’ as 
opposed to ‘place based’ (O’Brien et Al., 2017). The territorial narrative and resources of EU 
structural funds have countered this kind of spatialized market fatalism applied to places and 
communities, though in the post-2008 context they too have increasingly had to justify 
themselves in terms of their contribution to growth agendas, with some commentators feeling 
that they have been ‘captured’ by the competitiveness agenda (Hague, 2016).  
Yet despite this, the ESIFs continue to promote place-based territorial development bringing 
some “work to the people” in less economically developed parts of the EU.  Following the 
global financial and economic crisis of the late 2000s, public investment in the Member 
States “most affected…would have fallen by an additional 50%” without the support of EU 
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Cohesion Policy” (European Commission 2014: 2). In the EU’s territorial cohesion narrative 
such support is seen as an act of European solidarity and intrinsically the right thing to do, but 
also as a positive investment in territorial potential and development (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008; European Commission, 2009). Ironically, even some 
Eurosceptics may see the benefit of such investment, which in bringing greater opportunities 
to people in situ - where they are, can help to moderate and stabilise migration flows towards 
the more economically developed EU member states. The economic situation in Poland, for 
example, improved significantly following the country’s 2004 EU accession helped in part by 
Cohesion Policy investments (Kolodziejczyk, 2016).   
Within the wider context and history of EU regional policy outlined above, there is also a 
particular and rather secret ‘British story’ to which the following section now turns.  
 
From British to European Regional Policy– a much appreciated ‘secret’ contribution to 
the European project 
 
From the 1930s onwards Britain pursued a form of regional policy to try and provide 
opportunity and more equal levels of economic development between her regions (McCrone, 
1969). The Barlow Report (1940), for example, recommended action to address the issues of 
‘distressed areas’ and foster more balanced distribution of industry and population to make 
better use of national resources. These issues have been of varying concern to different UK 
governments down to the present day as reflected by recent initiatives such as the Northern 
Powerhouse which seeks to close the productivity gap between the north and south of 
England by encouraging growth across the larger northern city regions (Nurse, 2015).   
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Over the decades, UK regional policy has typically sought to address the structural industrial 
and employment issues facing regions which became heavily industrialised from the 19
th
 
century onwards – often though not exclusively, in the north and west of the UK.  By the 
1970s, notably following the oil crisis of 1973, many of these regions and their communities 
were facing the full effects of economic restructuring. This was manifested in rising levels of 
unemployment and the physical change and frequent dereliction/pollution of landscapes and 
the living environment for local communities. Many areas of the UK continued to face such 
challenges into the Thatcher era of the 1980s and beyond. Meanwhile other major European 
countries such as France and West Germany were still enjoying relative prosperity in the 
1970s with relatively low levels of unemployment and high levels of GDP per capita 
compared with the UK. This was the context in which the UK joined the then European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 that led to this new Member State playing a very 
particular role in the evolution of the wider European project which it had now joined.  
 
In fact a form of EEC regional policy had been discussed for some time, but the UK joining 
provided an added impetus to its development (Manzella & Mendez, 2009). As noted above, 
the UK had long pursued such a regional policy and the idea of developing an EEC 
equivalent appealed as a means of ensuring that the UK received a larger direct return on its 
contribution to the EEC budget. This was because the UK was not expected to benefit as 
much as certain other states from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), having a different 
economic structure, a lower share of the workforce employed in agriculture (O’Brien and De 
La Escosura, 1992) and facing a different set of regional development issues. The creation of 
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in the mid-1970s was thus a product of 
the UK working with certain other EEC member states (Ireland and Italy). It was an early 
example of how engaging with other countries within the EEC could produce results and 
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outcomes which benefitted the UK – in this case her economically struggling regions and by 
extension the communities within these. Contrary to the received wisdom of many in the UK 
regarding the peripherality of British interests and influence in the EEC/EU, the creation of 
the ERDF remains a key and well-regarded contribution to ‘European construction’. French 
author Claude Husson has even rather declaratively titled a section of a book on the 
emergence of territorial cohesion policy in Europe, - ‘Merci monsieur les anglais!’ (Husson, 
2002). 
The emergence of a European regional policy and the ‘structural funds’ which supported it 
was to prove particularly significant to the UK, which at the time was facing dramatic 
economic change sooner than countries like France and Germany; was relatively poorer; had 
higher levels of unemployment; and, more social unrest (Couch et Al., 2011).  Economic 
restructuring impacted particularly on those areas and communities with a high dependency 
on traditional manufacturing sectors, including many areas of northern and western Britain 
that bore a disproportionate part of the social, economic, environmental and cultural costs of 
change from the 1970s onwards. Resultant urban problems were largely, although not 
exclusively, concentrated in the ‘inner cities’ of urban areas in these regions. But it was not 
simply the actual effects on the ground of economic change that made the support provided 
by European regional policy so significant at the time. The broad ‘social democratic 
consensus’ of the postwar years had given way to the rise of neoliberal influence on the state 
and public policy (Monbiot, 2016). This advocated less state spending and intervention to 
address the consequences of economic and social change. The context of economic 
turbulence, mass unemployment and urban unrest in the 1980s, reinforced the shift towards 
an urban focus in state spatial policy with the emergence of ‘urban regeneration’ as a major 
focus of urban policy. This sought to address urban ‘problems’, typically in what Thatcher 
famously described as “those inner cities” (Guardian Newspaper, 2014).  Regional policy 
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meanwhile was increasingly sustained as an idea and financially – notably after 1989, by 
European Cohesion Policy programmes.  
Domestically, urban policy was increasingly dominated by Central Government initiatives 
allied with an increased role for the private sector (Parkinson, 1989).  The national 
government’s general scepticism towards public action led to the local government being 
marginalised in the urban regeneration process particularly in the 1980s. In some circles of 
government there was even talk of “managed decline” for certain major urban areas such as 
Liverpool (Guardian Newspaper, 2011; Liverpool Echo, 2015). Such thinking would have 
been unacceptable to post-war British governments of any political hue prior to the neoliberal 
ascendancy of the 1970s and 1980s.  Crucially it remained unacceptable to a number of key 
actors both in the UK and at the highest levels within the European institutions. Significantly 
- and with a resonance which echoes down to the current aftermath of the 2016 EU 
referendum, those Conservatives who advocated more attention and resources for 
regeneration – notably Michael Heseltine; were also amongst the most pro-European 
members of a party whose internal ‘civil war’ over Europe ultimately led the UK to the 
juncture it faces today.  EU funding programmes meanwhile were stepping in to support 
communities devastated economically and socially by the state’s campaign against certain 
industrial sectors and communities (e.g. initiatives such as ‘RECHAR’ which provided EU 
support to communities affected by pit closures)
1
.  
As the 1990s arrived, the shocking truth was revealed that some areas of the UK such as 
Merseyside and South Yorkshire were now eligible for the highest level of European regional 
policy support (called ‘Objective 1’). This was available to regions whose Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per head was below 75% of the European average – regions normally to be 
                                                          
1
 Though difficulties in securing UK funding to ‘match’ this were reported and debated in Parliament. See: 
http://www.parliament.uk/edm/1989-90/1306 
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found in the relatively less prosperous countries of the EC such as Ireland, Greece, Spain or 
Portugal. The regional consequences of Thatcherism were stark and could not be masked 
completely by the wider return to growth of the 1990s.   Though the UK had one of the 
largest economies in what was now called the EU (after 1993) it also had the largest regional 
disparities in terms of economic development level.  Through the 1990s, EU structural fund 
support in regions such as Merseyside, South Yorkshire parts of Wales and Cornwall had 
significant effects on helping to regenerate the physical environment and ameliorate social 
conditions.   
The Merseyside Objective 1 programme, for example, directly sought to address the needs of 
communities through its ‘Pathways’ programme which was seen as a best practice example at 
EU level. The requirements of EU funding such as the need to ‘match fund’ projects 
(meaning the member state had to contribute too)
2 
 and the need to manage Structural Fund 
programmes also obliged the national government to think about how it would deliver 
regeneration. New institutions such as Regional Government offices were created in part to 
oversee EU regional programmes and played a role in tailoring policy to regional 
circumstances and communicating regional needs to Whitehall. Other principles of EU 
funding such as partnership working helped build governance capacity (e.g. at city regional 
level) and the fact it operated over a cycle of 6 yearly budgets gave more certainty over 
resources for a longer period.  
Following the election of the New Labour government in 1997 and into the 2000s, EU 
structural funding priorities and programmes dovetailed well with national initiatives and 
objectives such as the ‘urban renaissance’ and the social inclusion and neighbourhood 
renewal agendas. Against a backdrop of generally rising prosperity EU structural funds 
                                                          
2
 This is due to the principle of ‘additionality’ which means that the EU Structural Funds “may not replace 
public or other equivalent structural expenditure by the Member State”.   
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played a significant role in fostering faster growth in some previously ‘lagging’ areas such as 
Merseyside, South Yorkshire and the Highlands and Islands. This led such areas to begin to 
emerge from this status as their GDP per head figures gradually converged with the EU 15 
average. The entry of less prosperous nations into the EU in the mid-2000s also had a 
significant impact here due to the so-called ‘statistical effect’ – this meant that the average 
level of GDP per head level in the EU fell making the UK regions which had previously been 
amongst the poorest in the EU seem relatively more prosperous ‘overnight’.  In effect there 
was a need to deal with regional disparities that were much greater in the new EU of 28 states 
than in the former EU of 15 states.  
But beyond the redistribution of resources to less prosperous areas, the EU structural funds 
also had significant symbolic and political value to some places and the opportunities they 
have opened-up for empowerment of local decision-makers and communities should not be 
underestimated. In a traditionally highly centralised state such as the UK, the ability for cities 
and regions to engage in ‘three way’ negotiation with central government and the EU 
commission has given new leverage for place-based development to local politicians and 
communities.  Access to EU funding and the ‘European stage’ (Lord and Sykes, 2011) has 
enabled some cities and communities to regain the sense of worth and dignity which was 
stripped from them in the national context in the latter decades of the 20
th
. century -  for 
example, through media and political stereotyping about certain places being welfare 
dependant failures inhabited by benefit scroungers (Boland, 2008).  The renaissance of cities 
such as Liverpool cannot be attributed solely to EU programmes,  but the idea that major 
regional cities can be described as international centres or ‘European Cultural Capitals’ 
(Garcia et Al., 2010) is in no small due part to the role EU-support has played in on to 
reimaging and reimagining such places.  Given the British experience of EU regional policy 
and its effects on specific places briefly outlined above, one of the questions as the 2016 EU 
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referendum approached was how far these might affect attitudes towards the EU. In 
particular, how might the more local EU territorial interest of places and populations be 
recognised within wider context of a strongly ‘nationalist’ (including in the sense of a scalar 
focus on the nation state level) debate and campaign? Such issues are explored in the 
following section.  
 
The result of the 2016 EU referendum – regions ‘out of’ and ‘against’ themselves?    
 
Despite the UK’s experience of EU regional policy outlined above, Hague (2016) - writing in 
the aftermath of the EU referendum, commented -“I doubt that the phrase "territorial 
cohesion" was ever uttered in the thousands of speeches and pamphlets” during the EU 
referendum.  Perhaps this accounted at least in part for the fact that many areas which are not 
only the key UK beneficiaries of EU funding, but which also have economies that are more 
integrated with the rest of the EU than those of London and the South East (McCann, 
2016a,b; Semple, 2017), voted to leave the EU. In contrast the majority of metropolitan 
centres and urban cores voted to remain in the EU.  In the north west of England Liverpool 
and Manchester voted to remain in the EU. Liverpool saw a vote of 58% to remain in the EU; 
73% of the electorate failed to back the leave cause; and, as a proportion of the city’s 
population at the last census (2011), the leave vote represented around 18% of the population 
(Liverpool City Council, n.d.). 
In Wales, whilst the overall vote was to leave the EU, there were marked differences across 
the parts of the country which receive the highest levels of EU structural and investment fund 
support having  ‘less developed region’  status (i.e. a GDP/head < 75% of the EU average).  
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Within the ‘West Wales and the Valleys’3 EU funding area (Welsh Assembly Government, 
2017), for example, the Welsh speaking heartland of Gwynedd voted 58% remain, but in the 
east places like Blaenau Gwent voted strongly to leave (62%). As Richard Wyn Jones has 
noted given that the “Barnett formula leaves Wales under-funded to the tune of some £300m 
per annum compared with similar English regions, the fact that some 52.5% of the Welsh 
electorate chose to further impoverish their country by voting to exit the European Union 
appears to be bizarrely self-defeating” (Wyn Jones, 2016).  Similarly, in Cornwall, which 
stood to benefit from ESIF support of approximately £947 per capita in the 2014-2020 period 
(Gomez, 2013), there was also a strong leave vote (56.5%). In the wake of the referendum the 
leader of the County Council moved quickly to state he would be asking the UK government 
to ensure that “Cornwall receives investment equal to that provided by the EU programme 
which has averaged £60m per year over the last ten years” (Independent Newspaper, 2016). 
There was (all too predictable?) disappointment for the region in February 2017 however as it 
only secured a much more modest sum in its ‘growth deal’  worth less than one third than the 
£60 million that which it receives annually from the EU (Independent Newspaper, 2017; UK 
Government, 2017).
 
 
Yet whilst it is true that in many less prosperous areas there was a leave majority amongst 
those who voted; as Danny Dorling points out “Contrary to popular belief, 52% of people 
who voted Leave in the EU referendum lived in the southern half of England, and 59% were 
in the middle classes, while the proportion of Leave voters in the lowest two social classes 
was just 24%” (Dorling, 2016).  Similarly, much analysis of the results may overemphasise 
geographical versus value-based explanations of why certain individuals voted to leave the 
EU (Kaufmann, 2016). Despite the complex picture, since the referendum most commentary 
on the result has tended to emphasise the notion that the referendum result was due to a 
                                                          
3 See: http://gov.wales/docs/wefo/publications/160917-erdf-operational-programme.pdf  
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‘revolt’ of the ‘forgotten’ or ‘just about managing’ people – who live in ‘forgotten’ or 
‘neglected’ places’.  The strong place-based element in this narrative sees places like 
Sunderland and Stoke on Trent, being cast as the locus of a revolt against the ‘establishment’ 
(lead by the establishment). Furthermore, whilst it is undeniably the case that a portion of 
those living in such areas, were persuaded to vote leave,  the constant attributing of the result 
solely to such places and groups may also offer a form of ‘forward defence’ strategy for the 
progenitors and promoters  of  so-called Brexit. If ‘Brexit Britain’ does not live up to the 
expectations and promises which its supporters have loaded it with, opinion will have been 
primed to know who - and crucially where to blame
4
.  If some places ‘fail’ to thrive following 
the UK’s exit from the EU – those perhaps that stand to lose the most EU regional funding, 
and/or (and it will often be ‘and’) with sectors highly dependent on access to EU markets, 
then might this be constructed as their own fault? Will they be considered to have ‘let the side 
down’; voted for ‘Brexit’ but not unable to ‘make the most of it’; or, seen as expecting the 
state to ‘pick-up the pieces?’ etc. (one can almost visualise the headlines in the ‘Brexit’ 
supporting press). What will the post-EU British polity’s response be? Which place-based 
solutions will be adopted (‘Managed Decline 2.0’ anybody?)?  But more seriously, the 
aftermath of the referendum raises significant questions about the future form and role of 
place-based policy in a post-EU Britain to which the following section now turns.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 In this context it is noteworthy that the current (April 2017) International Trade Secretary has already been 
reported as stating that British business has become too ‘fat and lazy’ to make the most of the opportunities 
apparently offered by leaving the EU (BBC News, 2016a). 
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Place-based policy in a post-EU Britain – what happens next? 
 
There is a profound territorial ‘irony’ (for want of a better word) embedded in the EU 
referendum results. This is that over recent decades a whole suite of EU programmes and 
initiatives have meant that many places which voted leave were in practice given greater 
attention and resources - were ‘less forgotten’ (to paraphrase current media narratives), than 
might otherwise have been the case had the UK not been compelled through EU 
programming to give greater consideration to their needs (as domestic regional policy had 
done in the less liberalised UK polity that obtained before the end of the post-WW2 
consensus in the 1970s – O’Brien et Al., 2017).  As noted in earlier sections, designation as a 
region eligible for EU regional funding support played a crucial role in requiring government 
to pay attention to such areas and ‘match’ fund EU projects with domestic resources.  Yet, the 
referendum also raises searching questions about what might be termed the ‘limits of place-
based policy’.   
The derelict, dangerous, and not infrequently toxic, environments of the post-industrial 
1970s-1990s have been improved in many places as a result of national and EU regeneration 
and territorial investment programmes and environmental legislation. However, during and 
after the EU referendum many stories appeared in the mass media about individuals in places 
extensively transformed through such interventions who believed that nothing had ever been 
done for their areas (Cadwalladr, 2016; Morris, 2016). The physical transformations and 
economic development delivered through planning and place-based investment since the 
1980s it seems had only done so much to transform some places in a manner that felt 
inclusive, and delivered opportunity, to all their inhabitants. This is not to argue that these 
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actions have ‘comprehensively’ failed, or, as some might have argued previously (Leunig et 
Al. 2007), that place-based policy is destined to provide only palliative relief for some places, 
and resources should not be committed to it in future. Place-based development is replete 
with ‘wicked-problems’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973) which may originate, and need to be 
addressed, at scales remote from the locality and beyond the purview and influence of local 
policy and decision makers.  Still, the evidence, and for some a moral commitment, implies 
that policy and public investment in places facing particular challenges still has an important 
role to play despite its limits (Shaw and Sykes, 2015; Parkinson, 2016). But as the UK 
prepares to leave a bloc in which belief in territorial development policy and redistributive 
place-based programmes is not just an article of faith but a Treaty Article (to be precise 
Articles 174 to 178 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); see also 
Faludi, 2007), the question is what shape and scale may it assume in a post-EU Britain? 
At the risk of disappointing the reader, it will be immediately obvious that the latter question 
is effectively unanswerable at the time of writing! But notwithstanding this some tentative 
observations are offered below.  
One of the arguments of the Leave campaigners was that the money redistributed via EU 
structural funds was ‘only our money that we get back anyway’. Once the UK leaves the EU 
the argument was that such monies might then simply be redistributed to the same regions 
which had previously benefitted from EU support. Yet, the mechanisms and political trade-
offs involved in how any government chooses to spend public resources across the territories 
under its jurisdiction in truth reflect a complex interaction of national priorities, the success 
of places in lobbying for their interests, and of course how much there is in in the coffers 
‘centrally’ to allocate.   
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The political and contingent nature of decisions about territorial resource distribution is well-
illustrated by some previous episodes related to EU funding in the UK.  In the early 2000s 
when a new EU regional policy was being discussed, many UK local authorities supported 
the EU Commission’s proposal for a larger EU budget than that wanted by the UK and 
certain other net contributor states (Sykes and Baeing, 2016). This was because they realised 
that a larger EU budget would mean greater regeneration funding for their areas. In other 
words at one of the most prosperous points in the UK’s recent economic history the best way 
for some UK regeneration areas to get a larger share of UK national resources to spend on 
improving social, economic and environmental conditions was to see UK wealth routed and 
redistributed through the mechanism of EU Cohesion Policy. The UK government sought to 
diffuse the situation by offering a guarantee that if the lower budget proposed by the UK and 
other net contributors states was accepted, that UK territories would not lose out in terms of 
funding (North West Regional Assembly, 2003: 5) (though this commitment was 
subsequently  withdrawn).   More recently, in the allocation of the 2014-2020 structural funds 
the 2010-2015 UK Coalition government used its ‘sovereignty’ to reduce EU funding 
allocated to places like Liverpool and Sheffield already suffering from swingeing cuts to 
budgets under the same administration’s austerity programme (Public Sector Executive, 
2014; Waddington, 2014; Thorp, 2017).  Such episodes illustrate the power plays and diverse 
calculations surrounding competing territorial and other interests which influence how 
resources are distributed in an advanced liberal democratic state such as the UK. 
Furthermore, monitoring the effects of any form of ‘Brexit’ on place-based investment 
trajectories should not solely be confined to the foregone investments of ESIF monies. Rarely 
mentioned, for example, is the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) which has been 
investing more and more in the UK in recent years. Over the 2012 – 2016 period the EIB 
invested €31.3 billion in the UK (European Investment Bank, n.d). In 2015 it committed its 
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highest ever level of investment to the UK, providing €7.77 billion to support sectors 
including energy, water, transport, health, education and housing (HM Treasury and Osborne, 
2015). In 2016 it made investments worth €5.5 billion in the UK and invested over £1.3 
billion to build and improve social housing through loans to housing associations and the 
Housing Finance Corporation (investment which continues at the time of writing) (European 
Investment Bank, 2017). Another important EU funding stream is the strategic investment in 
transport (e.g. the Trans-European Transport Network -TEN-T) and communication 
networks. In the past this has co-funded projects like the A55 in North Wales and more 
recently the electrification of a Liverpool-Manchester railway line. Given the concern over a 
mismatch between infrastructure funding per head between London and the rest of the UK 
(Berry et Al., 2015) it remains to be seen what any withdrawal of this will mean for the 
balance of infrastructure investment across the UK.   
Against such a background, following the referendum, the prospects for ongoing and planned 
EU investments in the UK were naturally of concern to policymakers in many places. In 
August 2016 the Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond announced that any EU 
projects signed-off before the 2016 Autumn statement would be backed, with an assessment 
to be made later of whether certain other projects would also have their funding guaranteed 
(Hammond, 2016). Representatives of the devolved administrations, and the Chair of the 
Local Government Association however, all sought more long-term certainty (BBC News, 
2016).   On 3rd October 2016 the cut-off point of the autumn statement was extended, so that 
for example ESIF
5
 bidders could continue ongoing talks with DCLG even if signed after the 
autumn statement (HM Treasury et Al., 2016; Unger, 2016). Whilst this provided some short 
term certainty, there was no clear commitment on whether levels of support comparable to 
                                                          
5
 A good overview of the European Structural and Investment Fund is provided on the website of the network 
of Local Enterprise Partnerships https://www.lepnetwork.net/esif-programmes/ 
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those that areas like Wales and Cornwall might have received from the EU post-2020, will be 
maintained.   
The Industrial Strategy Green Paper published in early 2017 did not provide much more 
clarity simply stating that “We will [also] carefully consider the future of the European 
Structural and Investment Funds alongside the wider future funding environment following 
the UK’s exit from the European Union” (HM Government, 2017: 114).  The Green Paper 
also claimed that it proposed “a framework to build on the particular strengths of different 
places and grasp the opportunities that could enable faster growth in each of them” (HM 
Government, 2017: 114) – a passage which chimes strongly with the EU’s territorial 
development philosophy of the past decade (O’Brien et Al., 2017). So there are also hints of 
possible continuity in how territorial development may be viewed and supported. The Green 
Paper even references the EU’s ESPON territorial research programme and cites European 
comparators such as Germany and France when observing that urban productivity and 
innovation could be improved in the UK (HM Government, 2017: 108). Intriguingly, given 
that this performance has been achieved by these countries whilst being fully part of the EU, 
the Green Paper does not explain how the UK leaving the EU is supposed to contribute to 
improved UK performance in these areas. 
The past and evolving contexts and episodes of central-local interaction described in the 
preceding paragraphs underline the fact that one potential impact of the end of three way 
negotiation between localities, national (UK) government and the EU, will be the generation 
of new power-relations between scales of governance and territorial administrations.  With 
central government potentially becoming the main source of ‘payment for the piper’ in place-
based investment, its ability to ‘call the tune’ may well grow. The power symmetries which 
may result from the interaction of the new context with new territorial and administrative 
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configurations such as Combined Authorities in England (Sykes and Nurse, forthcoming) 
also remain to be seen.  
 
Discussion and Some Tentative Scenarios   
 
The future of the UK’s relationship with the European Union is unknown. Much will depend 
on the outcome of the Article 50 exit negotiations, accompanied and followed by many years 
of working on defining a new relationship.  Yet despite the enduring uncertainties around the 
prospects for place-based policies, the following five scenarios attempt to summarise possible 
outcomes of the re-negotiation of UK’s relationship with EU territorial development: 
Scenario 1: Negotiations between the EU and the UK fail and the UK leaves the EU without 
a trade deal. Any form of regional policy may need to be replaced by domestic funding 
arrangements. UK territories will be at the mercy of domestic trade-offs and politically 
expedient ‘sweetheart deals’ with particular places (Walker, 2017) and sectors (Jenkins, 
2016). Commenting on the draft Industrial Strategy the Commons Select Committee on 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy has already recommended that “the Government 
steps back from its current trajectory of focussing on sectoral 'deals' which risk a return to the 
discredited credo of 'picking winners'”(Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, 
2017). 
Scenario 2: The UK leaves the Single Market to get control over migration from EU/EEA 
countries, but remains, possibly partly, in the customs union. EU Cohesion Policy in the UK 
will most likely stop in this scenario, though one could imagine a coordination of 
infrastructure network planning as part of the EU TEN-T funding. More widely, as with 
Scenario 1, UK territorial funding may be subject to domestic trade-offs between a powerful 
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central state and sub-state territories administratively organised according to a ‘variable 
geometry’ with varying degrees of devolution and autonomy. 
Scenario 3: The UK follows the example of Switzerland and negotiates a complex range of 
bilateral agreements with the EU. In practice this may be very similar to a full EEA 
membership and would include being part of the EU’s Single Market. If this follows the 
model of Switzerland, this may involve accepting free movement of workers. This may also 
include a continuing contribution to the EU’s regional policy and TEN-T programmes and 
may mean a continuation of regional funding in the UK, though it would not include 
participation in the Common Agricultural Policy.  
Scenario 4: The UK joins Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway and becomes a full member of 
the EEA. This would be similar to Scenario 3, though the EEA is governed by an EEA 
council. Free movement of workers would be part of this membership, though not the 
Common agricultural Policy Common Fisheries Policy with their associated funding streams 
or the Customs Union. Regional policy and TEN-T funding may continue under this 
arrangement. UK territories may still be able to benefit from EU-style integrated territorial 
funding packages and EU mechanisms for territorial redistribution of resources. 
 Scenario 5: The article 50 negotiations may fail or the various parliaments may not all agree 
to the exit deal, and the UK could then remain part of the EU. At the same time the EU’s 
policy on freedom of movement may be reformed, which may give a political incentive for 
the UK government to remain in the EU after all. UK territories will be able to benefit fully 
from participation in the next round of EU territorial development policy and have full access 
to relevant ESIF funds.   
The current political intention of the UK government would seem to suggest that Scenario 2 
is the most likely outcome. Over the years of lengthy negotiations which will be required to 
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develop this, the UK might then move more towards Scenario 3 following the Swiss example. 
But one should not rule out the other scenarios as, unlikely as some of them may seem from 
the current perspective, both the UK’s and the EU’s politics can change.  The EU is currently 
reflecting on Five Scenarios for its future development to 2025 (European Commission, 
2017) which may shape how it approaches both the UK’s leaving negotiations and the design 
of future territorial development policy and programme post-2020. 
 
Conclusion 
In February 2017 the Northern Powerhouse Investment Fund (NPIF), was launched with the 
aim of “boosting the North of England’s economy and helping the region’s businesses realise 
their growth potential”. Of the £400m being made available £184 million was provided by 
the European Investment Bank - a fact few Britons are ever likely to see communicated in 
their media (EIB, 2017).  Yet the reality is that since the 1970s when the UK with other EEC 
Member States lobbied for the establishment of a European regional policy, the EU and its 
predecessors have been a significant player in regeneration across the UK’s regions and 
communities. The question now is who, or what, will replace its contribution and at which 
level of support? But beyond wider economic impacts of leaving the EU and single market 
and the potential loss of EU territorial and other investments in UK places, the process of 
exiting the EU will impact localities and people in other ways. The opportunity costs of 
diverting resources and attention (e.g. Parliamentary time) from authentic national policy 
challenges such as the crises in housing (Sykes and Shaw, 2017) and health services, and 
other important areas of government policy from Higher Education, to social and 
environmental policy (Cowell, 2017) may be high - and impact disproportionality on those 
places and communities who can least afford to bear them. Monitoring the distributional 
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effects on people and places will be an important task of researchers in the socio-spatial 
disciplines over the coming years, especially those such as urban planning which have an 
explicit normative and ethical as well as analytical orientation (Campbell, 2015; Silva et Al., 
2015a).  
Despite the concerns of some progressives about the liberalising aspects of the EU (Piketty, 
2016) it is still an organisation that devotes almost half its (modest in relative terms) budget
6
 
to trying to uphold the principle that “No-one should be disadvantaged by where they happen 
to be born or live” which is the fundamental territorial expression of the principle of social 
democracy. In the UK context – particularly in light of the kind of ‘Brexit’ which currently 
seems most likely to be pursued by the government, slogans such as a post-Brexit economy 
that “works for everyone” (May, 2016), or “‘Labour Brexit’ that works for everyone” (Left 
Foot Forward, 2017), so far only offer a rather meagre substitute for Europe’s committed 
decades-long support of Britain’s unevenly developed regions and their communities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 The EU budget represents approximately 1% of the GDP of the 28 EU states. Allowed EU spending in 2014-
2020 is around €960 billion compared with, for example, expected UK public sector spending in 2016-17 of € 
980.28 billion).(See http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06455/SN06455.pdf and 
www.gov.uk/government/publications/budget-2016-documents/budget-2016) 
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